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Introduction
As China's economy develops, more and more rural labourers have embarked for the city to earn a living, and have been playing an increasingly important role in China's urban economic development. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 145.33 million rural migrant labourers were working in urban China in 2009, accounting for 18.6 per cent of all employment in the country. While this substantial level of migration to urban areas permits rural labourers to earn more income, the nature of the rural-urban dual economy means that rural-urban migration may introduce various social and economic problems, especially with regard to social security.
In recent decades, social security systems for urban and rural residents have been administered separately. The system for urban residents included social insurance, social welfare, the special care and placement system, social relief and housing services. Social insurance included pension insurance, unemployment insurance, medical insurance, work-related injury insurance and maternity insurance, which together formed the core of the social security system.
The household contract responsibility system was in practice in rural areas, and self reliance was the basis of economic security among rural residents, with the land as a means of production and of earning a living. As China's economy has developed, the rural-urban divide has generally increased; social security benefits have not been an exception to this rule.
The central government, being aware of the problem, proposed a new development philosophy of a "scientific development approach, balancing the interests of all parties and putting people first."
For issues pertaining to social security, the government proposed to set up a uniform social security system that treats urban and rural workers the same with respect to pension contributions and payouts regardless of their place of residence, place of work and sector of employment. This led into the piloting and dissemination of the new rural old-age insurance and rural cooperative medical insurance systems. However, the social security system was not unified for migrant workers due to hukou-related constraints.
As one of the most important parts of the uniform social security system, social security for migrant workers should not be neglected. In this project, we focus on migrant workers' pension insurance (the most important part of the social insurance system) and also look at the substantial migration of rural labour in order to analyze the reform of China's social security system.
Existing pension insurance system in China and policy relevance

Pension insurance for urban enterprise workers
The existing pension insurance system in China makes use of a unified account that combines social pooling and individual accounts. This system has gradually come into place since the Announcement on Deepening the Reform of the Old-Age Insurance System for Employees of I. Introduction II. Existing pension insurance system in China and policy relevance Enterprises (State Decree No.: [1995] 6 by the State Council) was declared. In 1997, the State
Council also issued the Decision on The Reform of the Old-Age Insurance System for Employees of Enterprises that unified pension insurance systems across urban China. In December 2000, the State Council issued the Pilot Area Scheme to Perfect Urban Social Security Systems, that adopted individual account operations, changed the conditions that link social pooling and the individual account, and started the reform of partial accumulation of the pension insurance system in China. In order to adapt to an aging population, a more diversified labour market and urbanization, and also to establish a long-lasting pension insurance system, the State Council also issued the Decision on Perfection of Basic Pension Insurance System for Enterprise Workers (State Decree No.: [2005] 38) to improve the existing pension insurance system.
The main contents of this paper are the following: the system combines social pooling and individual account pension systems; the scope of insurance coverage is all workers in urban firms, industrial and commercial households and other flexible workers; when firms hire workers, both parties contribute to social insurance with the firm contributing to the social pooling and the worker contributing to their own individual account; individual businesses don't hire workers, are thus selfemployed, and should contribute to both social pooling and their individual account; flexible workers are treated similarly to individual businesses; those who meet the age requirement and who contribute to the pension insurance continuously for at least 15 years can obtain a monthly pension;
the pensions consist of a foundation pension, transitional pension and individual account pension, with individual account pension paid by individual account and foundation pension and transitional pension paid by pooling fund. At present, fund budget management is at the provincial level in most of the country. 
Payment base
The payment base is100% of average wages of workers employed in municipality in previous year as payment base
Contribution rate 20% of payment base
Individual account ratio
8% of payment base
Individual account management
Individual payment and subsidies from enterprise and government are all attributed to the individual account, with interest paid in RMB at the one-year fixed deposit interest rate set by the Bank of China.
Pension treatment
Obtainment conditions
Age
Urban enterprise workers
The retirement age of enterprise workers is 60 years of age for male workers, 50 for female workers and 55 for female cadres.
For those conducting work that is underground, hightemperature or otherwise physically intense or dangerous, the retirement age is 55 years of age for male workers and 45 for female workers. -For those who completely lose the ability to work due to illness or non work-related injury, with medical documentation confirmed by the labour evaluation committee, the retirement age is 50 years of age for males and 45 for females.
Individual businesses and flexible workers
60 years for males and 55 for females
Contract-system peasant worker
Payment term
Payment term (including equivalent payment term) is up to 15 years
Calculation method
Monthly pension = foundation pension + transitional pension + individual account pension Foundation pension = monthly average wage of local inservice workers in previous year and indexed monthly average payment wage of individual × payment term × 1%
Transitional pension = average monthly wage of workers employed in municipality in previous year × equivalent payment term × transition coefficient Individual account pension = total individual account deposit ÷ months
Treatment adjustment
The State Council adjusts the basic pension level of retirees from enterprises in relation to wage and price fluctuations, with the adjustment being a function of annual average wage growth for locally employed workers in provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central authority.
Local governments may prepare concrete adjustment schemes according to their particular current conditions and submit them to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance for approval and implementation.
Fund management
Provincial level budget management
Pension insurance for rural residents
State Decree No.: [2009] 32 specifies the basic principles of "basic insurance guarantee, wide coverage, flexibility and sustainability," thus defining how the combined social pooling and individual account rural insurance system were to operate.
The main contents of the decree are as follows: the fund is accumulated from individual payments, contributions from village collectives and a government subsidy; an individual must pay an annual premium of 100-500 RMB; when the village has suffient resources, the community should use some democratic process to decide whether or how much it will contribute on the behalf of individuals; local finance departments must provide pension subsidies of no less than 30 yuan per year on behalf of each pension contributer; the aggregated capital from each of the three parties shall all be deposited into the individual accounts of participating peasants. Moreover, for those with a severe handicap or who are poor and have difficulties making the payment, the local government shall pay some or all of the insurance premium required to reach the minimum standard pension. Five payment levels: 100 yuan, 200 yuan, 300 yuan, 400 yuan and 500 yuan every year, local finance departments may add payment levels according to actual conditions. Participants may independently select payment levels and receive a higher pension if they pay more.
Collective allowance
There is no coercive provision on subsidy. Any village may make contributions on behalf of participants.
Government subsidy 1. Local finance departments shall provide a minimum annual subsidy of 30 yuan to each participant, with more benefits received by those who choose a higher level of payments.
2. Local finance departments shall make partial or whole payments at the lowest payment level (currently 100 yuan/year) for the severely handicapped or for other rural groups with payment difficulties.
3. The finance departments at each level of government shall pay the the full amount of foundation pension to qualifying participants, and the Central Finance Department shall give full subsidies (55 yuan/month at present) to midwestern areas according to the foundation pension standard confirmed by the Central Government and 50% of subsidies to eastern areas.
Individual account management
Individual contribution and subsidies from enterprise and government are all counted toward the individual account, with interest paid at the one-year fixed deposit interest rate in RMB set by the Bank of China.
Pension treatment
Obtainment condition 1. Pensionable age: any rural senior resident over 60 yers of age and having not enjoyed basic endowment insurance for urban workers may obtain the monthly pension.
2. Contribution term: when the system is implemented, if less than 15 years remain until the pensionable age, the contribution may be made annually or supplemented with the total payment term not exceeding 15 years. If the gap of the contribution term from the pensionable age is more than 15 years, the contribution may be made annually or supplemented with the total contribution term not less than 15 years.
3. Any rural senior resident over 60 years of age and having not participated in the urban basic endowment insurance may obtain the basic monthly pension without making contributions but his/her children who qualify for insurance shall participate in the insurance system and make their payments. Fund management During the present experimental period, the rural insurance fund is temporarily managed at the county level. With expansion and development of pilot areas, the fund will gradually become managed at a higher level of government.
The rural pension insurance consists of a basic pension and an individual account pension, the sum of which determines the size of the monthly payments received after retirement. The minimum basic pension of 55 yuan per month shall be provided in full by the responsible level of government.
The monthly payout from the individual account pension shall be equal to the final sum of deposits in the individual account divided by 139. The rural insurance fund shall be managed at the county level through social pooling.
Pension insurance policy for rural migrant workers
Urbanization reflects long-term social and economic development processes in China which concentrate secondary and tertiary industries in cities and which lead to a constant transfer of rural populations to non-agricultural industries and cities. With rapid economic development since the end of the 1970s, when China adopted the reform and opening up policy, major changes have occurred to the social structure. Urbanization has accelerated rapidly since 1995. According to the news office of State Council, the population of towns in China was 0.622 billion and the urbanization rate was 46.6% in 2009. Many forecasts predict that China will be more than 60% urban by 2030, and some predictions even range as high as 70%. This process involves a large number of peasant workers coming to cities for jobs, implying ongoing and significant transfers of personnel from rural to urban and from inland to coastal areas. In the meantime, both rural and urban labour markets will continue to expand, surely enticing more peasant workers to reside in cities, driving demand for social insurance such as pension insurance, medical insurance, and so on.
There was no uniform national pension insurance policy for rural migrant workers before 2010, due to the hukou-related constraints. In order to provide social security to these workers, some local governments propose flexible provincial or municipal policies to secure some contributions (depending on the local level of development) towards rural migrant workers' pension insurance, which can adopt individual, composite or absorption policy approaches. Individual policy was only set up to guarantee pension insurance for rural migrant workers, and was completely different from the urban system (examples of this approach include Beijing and Qingdao). Composite policy was also only for rural migrant workers, but it differed from the individual one in that it included pension insurance, medical insurance, injury insurance, etc. Shanghai, Chengdu and Dalian adopted this type of policy. Compared with the two preceding policies, the absorption policy did not set up a specific system for rural migrant workers, but instead integrated them into the existing urban pension insurance system. Guangdong is an example of a province that adopted this type of policy. 
Policy relevance of the reform for rural migrant workers' pension insurance
Rural migrant workers frequently join or leave the pension insurance system as a result of their frequent changes between employers and working locations. They also make fixed insurance payments over short periods of time, and have a low payment base and a small individual account fund. Meanwhile, most local systems specify a 15-year minimum contribution term for the individual to receive regular pension payouts, a condition that is rarely met by migrant workers due to residency restrictions, characteristics of the work they tend to be employed in (hard, dirty and boring physical work) and a labour market where employers could benefit from a supply of rural migrant workers that generally exceeds demand by paying low wages to young and strong workers. The most important problem they are exposed to is that their pension insurance contribution records are not transferred and continued when they move between cities. This situation led to their low participation in the pension insurance system (less than 20% in recent years), and many chose to leave the system at the end of each year.
This led the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) to put forward a new policy for public comment in February 2009, entitled the Scheme of Migrant Workers to Participate in the Basic Pension Insurance. This policy aims to provide basic pension insurance for rural migrant workers with a low contribution rate and wide coverage, and which is transferable and easy to link to the urban social security system. It includes three main points. First, the low income of rural migrant workers is taken into consideration by dropping a firms' contribution rate for rural migrant workers to 12%, a full 8 percentage points lower than the 20% in the urban system; as for the contribution rate of the rural migrant worker themselves, it is 4-8%. Second, in relation to the large flows of rural migrant workers, their contribution records can be transferred and continued.
Third, normal pension payouts require a minimum contribution term of 15 years. for rural migrant workers is no longer being considered and they will now be required to fully participate in the urban scheme, a shift that is of major significance for rural migrant workers. This document also describes how employee pension insurance contribution records (including for rural migrant workers) can be transferred: the total individual account contributed by the individual and 12 percent of the firm's contribution can be transferred between jurisdictions.
The main thrust of the two documents relating to migrant workers' pension insurance is that migrant workers should be integrated into the basic urban pension insurance system by altering the local distribution of benefits and by addressing various barriers to suitable pension insurance in order to guarantee the legal rights of the migrant workers. Despite progress in this area, we must be aware that, in practice, migrant workers have difficulties securing pension insurance due to two imperfections in China's social security system that will be presently introduced.
To start with, with respect to the contribution rate, the Scheme of Migrant Workers to Participate in the Basic Pension Insurance" shows us that the cost to migrant workers and employers to participate in the pension system is significantly lowered by bringing migrant workers into the pension insurance system in a manner that suits their low income. This policy, however, is not included in the Scheme on the Transfer and Continuation of Basic Pension Insurance Contribution Records of Urban Employees of Enterprises, which means that migrant workers have the same contribution and base rates as urban workers. Migrant workers may therefore obtain the same basic pension as urban workers in the future, but the large current income gap between migrant workers and urban employees means that the contributions required to receive a given size of pension payout would, on average, be a much greater burden for migrant workers.
Secondly, from the perspective of transfer and continuation of pension insurance between provinces or municipalities, the Scheme on the Transfer and Continuation of Basic Pension
Insurance Contribution Records of Urban Employees of Enterprises stipulates that, in cases where the basic pension insurance account is not tied to the individual's registered location of permanent residence, and contributions have been made over a total of 10 years in each location where they have an insurance record, then the basic pension insurance account and the related funds shall be designated to the place of registered permanent residence to handle the procedures to receive the basic pension. This means that many migrant workers must return to their registered permanent residence to receive their pension because few migrant workers are able to work in one place for more than 10 years. However, because the level of economic development often differs significantly between the location of employment and the registered location of permanent residence, the official policy may mean that migrant workers who do not work in one place for ten years will pay high premiums in their place of employment and receive low pension payouts in their region of residence. This is a situation where they can easily be expected to pay more into the plan than they will receive in future, a policy outcome that directly damages the rights and interests of migrant workers.
Given this situation, we would like to simulate changes according to the new pension insurance policy using the SICGE model, which includes a rural labour migration module, in order to analyze the impact of the new policy on migrant workers and the economy as a whole.
Literature review
There has been a great deal of academic interest in quantitative analysis and evaluation of pension reform policies. Feldstein (1974) pioneered the use of mathematical tools to describe aggregate capital accumulation in a social security system. Sargent and Wallace (1995) used a rational expectations model to examine the impact of pension fund systems. Seidman (1986) , Arrau (1990) , Kotlikoff (1997 and 1998) Given the importance of the issue of rural labour migration to China, there are comparatively few studies from abroad that address migrant workers' pension insurance. Several domestic researchers have carried out a number of qualitative studies and a handful of quantitative studies
III. Literature review
on the pension system for rural migrant workers. These studies were mostly survey-based.
Although forumlated as a pension policy, its implementation will touch on social and economic issues including employment, income, social equity, taxation and social welfare. These effects should therefore be considered in addition to the direct economic impacts of the policy. The labour market follows a lagged adjustment path. Real consumer wages are sticky in the short run, so short-run labour market pressures are mostly manifested through employment levels. In the long run, employment returns to the baseline case, with labour market pressures reflected by changes in real wages;  It includes international trade. Imports are (imperfect) substitutes to domestically produced goods (the Armington assumption is adopted). Exports face a foreign demand curve that is inversely related to the good's price; 
IV. Analytical framework
As indicated in Table 4 , SICGE contains 10 labour market categories: five employment categories, three unemployment categories, and two categories for new entrants. The first eight of these categories have associated employment activities. For example, the category AG in year t includes the number of person-years of labor supplied in rural agriculture in year t-1 that is still available for employment in year t. The activity AG for year t refers to the number of person-years occupied in rural agricultural employment in year t. Most labour in category AG in year t-1 is employed in activity AG in year t. However, some labour flows from AG to other categories and vice versa.
As indicated in Figure 2 , the supply of labour behaves differently in each category. Workers belonging to the rural employment and unemployment categories (AG, RNAG, MWE, RAGU and MWU) only supply labour to rural activities (AG, RNAG and MWE). New entrants to the rural labour market (NRUR) search for both rural and urban employment opportunities. This is based on the assumption that some urban firms recruit new entrants from rural areas and help them get urban residential status. New rural entrants with a university degree may therefore acquire a skilled position in an urban area and obtain urban residential status. Urban labour categories (UUSE, USE, UU, and NURB) only search for urban employment opportunities (UUSE and USE). • indicates that most people prefer to offer labour in the same category as the previous year.
Pension insurance of migrant workers
The model's social security system allows the policy simulation of migrant workers' pension insurance to operate via its influence on the supply and demand of migrant workers. We have designed a simple supply and demand framework for this purpose. Without considering other potential outcomes, the supply and demand of migrant workers shall be determined by the post-tax wage, and firms' demand for migrant workers shall be determined by total wage costs and the pretax wage when employing migrant workers. If we denote S as the supply of migrant workers, D as the demand for migrant workers, W pre as pre-tax wages and W post as post-tax wages, then we have the following formula:
This formula simply describes the labour market equilibrium for migrant workers, with a pre-tax and post-tax wage. In China, the difference between the pre-and post-tax wage is the personal income tax. Pre-tax income here is the cost of wages paid by the corporation to a migrant worker, including personal income tax, pension insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, employment injury insurance, maternity insurance and their housing accumulation fund. The posttax wage here refers to the worker's actual wage, which is equal to the pre-tax wage minus personal income tax, pension insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, employment injury insurance, maternity insurance and their housing accumulation fund. We must emphasize here that, although contributions to the Insurance and Housing Fund are paid by the firm, these expenses are calculated as a share of the firm's wage cost or as a share of migrant workers' pretax wage. From the perspective of migrant workers, this essentially amounts to a personal income tax. Since the focus of this paper is pension insurance, the other four types of insurance in the fund and the fund itself are not dealt with in detail in this paper. The pre-tax wage and the post-tax wage can thus be expressed by the following formula: W post = W pre -INSU INSU here refers to the pension insurance paid by the employer for migrant workers.
We should explain that migrant workers cannot be certain that they will receive the pension even if their employer paid into the system for migrant workers. This is due to the inability of migrant workers to register an urban residence, the transient nature of their employment and imperfections in the current social security system. When looking at the supply of migrant workers, we should therefore consider whether they expect to receive the local pension insurance (PREF). If they think that there is a low probability of receiving the insurance payout in the future, then PREF=0. If they think they will receive insurance payouts, then PREF>0. In other words, if they think they will receive a pension on a monthly basis after retirement as a result of participating in the same pension insurance system as urban workers, they will be considered as receiving a net benefit from participation in the public program that is equal to the higher costs of private pension insurance relative to participation in the basic pension insurance system. This means that the equilibrium level of migrant workers can be modified to:
As can be seen in figure 3 , the initial supply curve of migrant workers is S=S(W pre , INSU=0, PREF=0), the initial demand curve is D=D(W pre ) and the equilibrium lies at E(10,100). Here, we see a situation before introduction of the pension insurance for migrant workers: the pre-tax wage is 100, the supply and demand of migrant workers are both 10, their pre-tax wages are the same as their post-tax wages and no pension payout is expected in the future.
Figure 3: Analytical framework of the supply and demand of migrant workers
If the pension insurance for migrant workers cannot be transferred and continued across jurisdictions, the migrant worker can hardly meet the requirement that insurance contributions must be paid for 15 consecutive years in order to receive pension payments after retirement. According to labour law requirements, however, firms must pay pension insurance for migrant workers. If the contribution rate is 12%, this means that 12% of their income goes to the pension insurance, but they do not receive the pension later on due to the imperfection of the system. The contribution is equivalent to a tax levied on employees, and thus reduces their actual income. This situation does not change the demand curve of migrant workers, but the supply curve shifts to S'=S'(W pre , INSU=12, PREF=0) because migrant workers' actual income is lower. When an income tax is levied on migrant workers, if the demanded number of migrant workers is still 10, then their pre-tax wage will increase to 112. In the asbsence of any change in the migrant worker demand curve, the final equilbiium will rest at E'(8,105), i.e., the pre-tax wage will increase to 105 and the equilbirium number of migrant workers will fall to 8. Compared to E, the wage paid by firms will increase, fewer migrant workers will be employed and the overall social benefit is lower.
Finally, if migrant workers can transfer and continue their pension insurance, they will enjoy the basic pension so long as they can pay into the insurance for 15 consecutive years. Since the private insurance rate (which we assume to be 15% of the pre-tax wage) is higher than that of the basic pension insurance, migrant workers who participate in the basic pension insurance will receive pension payments and their actual income will rise. In this situation, since the pre-tax wage is the same, the demand for migrant workers does not change and the supply curve will move to S''=S''(W pre , Insurance=12, PREF=15) because the actual income of migrant workers rises. This means that if they can receive a 15% expected return (the actual return is 3% without the 12% tax) and the number of the employees demanded is 8, their pre-tax wage will fall from 105 to 90, and the final equilibrium will sit at E' '(11,99) . Comparing E' and E shows that if the employer's total wage bill declines, the number of employed migrant workers and the net social benefit both rise.
The above analysis illustrates that the transfer and continuation of pension insurance for migrant workers can directly influence the supply and demand of migrant workers, and an absence of this may negatively influence the social benefit. In this analytical framework, we simulate the policy usng a SICGE model.
Simulations
According to the above analytical framework, we can design different scenarios according to the degree of certainty that migrant workers have in the transfer and continuation of their pension insurance across jurisdictions.
Less confidence scenario: the pension insurance cannot be transferred or continued.
This scenario reflects the old policy. According to the Rules on Migrant Workers' Participation in Basic Pension Insurance, employers must pay the public pension insurance premiums for migrant workers: the firm must pay 12% of employee wages and the individual pays a further 4-8% (their employee contribution rate). For this exercise, we assume the employee contribution rate to be 6%. Before the Interim Procedures for the Pension Insurance Transfer and Continuation for Corporate Workers was implemented, pension insurance for migrant workers could not be transferred or continued to other jurisdictions, and insurance could only be reimbursed to the worker before they left their place of work. They were only reminbursed for their 6% individual contribution.
The 12% contribution from firms would enter into the common urban pension fund and could not be transferred or reimbursed, amounting to a net income loss for migrant workers.
V. Simulations
5.2 Security scenario: the pension insurance can be transferred and continued.
The contributions in this scenario are broadly similar to the less confidence scenario. As specified for implementation of the Interim Procedures for the Pension Insurance Transfer and Continuation for Corporate Workers, migrant workers' pension insurance cannot be reimbursed as a lump sum, but it can be transferred and continued to other municipalities/villages.
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the contribution shares paid by both firms and employees can be completely transferred. Here, we assume that they will need to purchase private insurance to look after their retirement needs if they do not contribute to the basic pension insurance. We assume that private insurance costs 3% more of wages than the basic pension insurance. This rate is assumed to be higher for private insurance because: the public benefit of the basic pension insurance, the high operational costs of private insurance, the low income of the migrant workers and their inability to pay for private insurance.
In other words, if they do not participate in the basic pension insurance, they must pay 21% of wages (12%+6%+3%) to receive a pension equivalent to the payments received through basic pension insurance. Their participation in the basic pension insurance rather than private insurance will save them the 3% of their wage spent on this insurance, so their actual expected benefit is the 15% of wages contributed to the individual's pension account, when adding the 12% paid by firms.
Well-expected scenario
In this scenario, the basic pension insurance for migrant workers can be transferred and continued and they can also enjoy the same types of social security insurance received by urban workers, thanks to an improvement to China's pension security system.
For example, including all migrants in Beijing in the urban pension insurance system enables the local governments to protect the workers' basic rights and interests, and also resolves similar issues relating to medical insurance and compulsory education for their children. We assume that the combined expected benefit for migrant workers will increase to a total of 30% of their wages.
Simulations results
Less confidence scenario Figure 4: Supply and demand of migrant workers and wage changes
We will first look at this scenario's effects on the supply and demand of migrant workers. If 12% of frms' total wage costs on migrant workers go to pension insurance, this is equivalent to a 12% tax on their income. Therefore, the post-tax wage of migrant workers will fall in the short term, reducing the supply of labour. The reduced labour supply will force firms to increase pre-tax wages to hire migrant workers, and firms' wage costs will increase. Given the increase in the wage cost, the firms' demand for migrant workers will be lower. The model simulation in scenario 1 finds a 4.11% reduction in the post-tax wage of migrant workers and a corresponding 1.18% fall in the supply. The pre-tax wage paid by firms rises by 8.96%, while the demand correspondingly falls by 3.23%. The gap between the pre-tax and post-tax wage is 12%.
A second point of interest in this scenario is its influence on employment. Since migrant workers' actual incomes fall, and there is no expected pension payout, their level of employment is bound to decline. The results of the model simulation show that 3.23% fewer migrant workers are employed as a result of this policy. Meanwhile, the influences of this policy on the employment of the other labourers can be divided into direct and indirect influences. For direct influences, since the pre-tax wage of migrant workers is higher, firms' employment costs also increase, reducing the demand for both migrant workers and all urban labourers (high-tech and low-tech labourers), with a net effect of lower urban employment. For the indirect influence, lower employment of migrant workers causes the economy to shrink and the quantity demanded of agricultural products will be lower, in turn leading to reduced exports of the agricultural products and employment of the rural labourers (agricultural and non-agricultural). Meanwhile, if migrant workers move back to rural areas for agricultural and/or non-agricultural employment, the supply of agricultural and non agricultural labourers in rural areas will increase. The results of the model simulation show that total employment of agricultural labourers in rural areas declines by 0.44%, employment of nonagricultural labourers increases by 0.10%, employment of low-skilled urban workers in urban areas falls by 0.20%, and employment of high-skilled workers increases by 0.49%. Since half of employed migrant workers in China work in secondary industries, overall employment falls by 0.64% despite the slight increase in the employment of non-agricultural labourers in rural areas.
Figure 5: Changes in employment of labour force segments
A third significant outcome of the simulation pertains to its macroeconomic effects. In the short run, since capital cannot immediately adapt to changes in employment, the reduction in employment will damage the economy. The details are as follow:
(1) Since both private and public consumption expenditures are determined by national income, national income will fall if the overall economy is damaged, leading to reduced consumption by private consumers and the government;
(2) The capital:labour ratio will increase if employment declines. According to the principle of declining marginal product, firm investment confidence will fall, leading to lower personal investment; and (3) The GDP identity shows that GDP is the sum of private and public consumption, investment, and exports and minus imports. Therefore, when GDP, private consumption, public consumption and investment all decline, net exports necessarily increase to maintain the balance. The simulation results show that the economy shrinks by 0.44% due to the return of many migrant workers to their hometowns. Private consumption, public consumption, investment and imports respectively fall by 1.10%, 1.10%, 3.19% and 1.40%, while exports increase by 2.38%.
In the long run, the reduction in employment proves to be short term, and wage adjustments allow a return to the baseline. Meanwhile, the lower expected rate of capital return will lead to lower investment and consistently lower capital accumulation. The negative short term impact on GDP will gradually fade in the long run, with both GDP and employment returning to the baseline. 
Security scenario
We will first look at this scenario's influence on the supply and demand for migrant workers.
Similar to scenario 1, a direct effect of levying 12% of the wage of migrant workers as a tax that their post-tax wage will be lower, and it thus reduces both the supply and demand of labour.
However, migant workers' ability to transfer and continue the basic pension insurance should effectively guarantee the pension. If they don't have to pay for private insurance, it means that the expected future return will be 15% (without the interest rate or compound interest), leading to an increase in the supply of migrant workers. The simulation results show that the post-tax wage of migrant workers falls by 8.09%, but the supply increases by 2.22%. Since the reduction of the posttax wage is smaller than in the first (less confidence) scenario, the increase in the pre-tax wage must be less than that in the first scenario in order to maintain the 12% gap between pre-and posttax wages. The increase in the pre-tax wage is lower, but still positive, so the cost of hiring a migrant worker still rises in this scenario, and demand for the workers thus declines. The simulation results show that the pre-tax wage of migrant workers (the wage cost paid by firms) is 4.48% higher and that the demand for migrant workers falls by 1.85%. A second set of outcomes in this scenario pertain to employment. Compared to scenario 1, migrant workers who are employed can expect to benefit under the changes in this scenario, but the level of employment of migrant workers still falls by 1.85% because firms' wage costs rise. The expected benefit for employed migrant workers in this scenario means that some agricultural and non-agricultural labourers in rural areas will move to urban areas, which is equivalent to an increase in the supply of migrant workers, and the employment of these two types of labour will fall. The simulation results show that employment of rural agricultural and non-agricultural labourers respectively fall by 0.63% and 0.25%. In urban areas, the increase in the supply of migrant workers will stimulate competition between low-skilled workers in urban areas. With an increase in the cost of labour to firms, however, the demand for low-and high-skilled workers nevertheless declines in urban areas, with a negative effect on employment for both types of labour. The simulation results indicate that total employment of low-and high-skilled workers respectively fall by 0.22% and 0.41%. Total employment across the economy declines by 0.53%, a smaller decline than in the first (less confidence) scenario.
The third area of effects we are interested in pertain to the macro-economy and industry. The analysis of overall economic effects in the second scenario is similar to that in the first scenario, but the effect of the second scenario is somewhat smaller. The model simulation indicates that the economy will shrink (by 0.36%), as do private consumption (0.84%), public consumption (0.84%), investment (2.42%) and imports (1.04%), while exports increase by 1.77%.
Well expected scenario
Compared to the first scenario, the short-term negative effects of the second scenario are relatively weak because pension insurance for migrant workers can be transferred and continued, although the economy will be smaller. Over the long run, this policy's effects on the overall economy are nearly negligible. In other words, despite the transfer and continuation of pension insurance for migrant workers, the policy still has negative short-term effects due to the uncertainty of future pension benefits for migrant workers. The effects of the policy will fade over time. The policy therefore needs to be improved by allowing migrant workers to have greater certainty that they will receive the payments in the future and by making every effort to provide them with access to sufficient social security and a prospect of a decent life for themselves and/or their children, to increase the attractiveness of opportunities in urban areas. In the third scenario, we see a much larger expected benefit for migrant workers, and we have found that the negative short-term effects continued to fade, allowing the policy to have a positive long term influence on economic growth.
Labour and capital (production factors) will be higher than in the baseline scenario over the long run, leading to higher GDP output. 
Conclusion and policy recommendations
The results of the first and second scenarios show that a migrant worker's inability to transfer and continue their pension contributions and payouts to another jurisdiction effectively lowers their income, inducing them to leave the city and return to their hometown or village. If pension insurance can be transferred and continued, the expectation of receiving a pension will attract rural workers to work in cities, partially reducing the negative effect of the direct payroll tax. Meanwhile, the results also indicate that migrant workers may be attracted to cities in the short run, but if migrant workers' expected benefit is not big enough under the policy, then the policy will have a neutral long-term effect: this would suggest that the transfer and continuation of the pension insurance only just manages to counter the negative effect of the direct tax on migrant workers.
In the present situation, the second scenario has the best outcome with respect to the transfer and continuation of pension insurance for migrant workers. The employer contribution rate is relatively low, and the enitre amount of the insurance can be transferred and continued (we assume that wage levels are the same across China). However, the contribution rate and payment base required for migrant workers in the Interim Procedures for the Pension Insurance Transfer and Continuation for Corporate Workers are the same as for private urban workers. Even without considering that the wage for migrant workers is much lower than that of the private urban workers, the employer contribution rate can be as high as 20%, which is much higher than the 12% rate used in this study. When the pension insurance is being transferred and continued, only 12% of total contributions from the firm are transferred as opposed to the complete share of the contribution we assumed. There is also the issue that very few migrant workers actually work in one place for 10 consecutive years, and that the levels of economic development and wages differ substantially between where they work and their formal place of residence. Together, these mean that the outcome of implementing the policy is that migrant workers pay high contributions into the pension system but receive a low level of pension. They may consequently receive less than they pay into the plan, and can generally expect much lower benefits than even the 3% benefit that we set when participating in a pension insurance system that can be transferred and continued. Here, we have a situation where the pension insurance transfer and continuation policy carries the potential to protect the pension benefits of migrant workers, but in its current form it actually damages their interests and has even more negative effects on the economy as a whole than the second scenario.
The average monthly salary for urban workers in 2008 was 2,408 RMB, so the payment base used to calculate the amount of pension insurance paid by firms is 1,445 RMB (60% of the average monthly salary). At this income level, the firms must pay 289 RMB per month (20% of the payment base) for each worker (whether urban or migrant workers). The average monthly salary for migrant workers, calculated using statistics from the Rural Economy Research Center of the Ministry of
VI. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Agriculture, was only 1,100 RMB in 2008. The minimum pension insurance paid by firms for migrant workers is 25% of their average monthly salary, or twice the 12% that we used in the simulation.
The negative effect of the current policy is therefore likely to be twice that estimated in the second scenario.
The above analysis leads us to believe that the current policy has, at best, a limited ability to stimulate the migration of rural labourers to urban areas and to guarantee the rights and interests of migrant workers. Other policies are needed to improve China's social security system, to promote the transfer of rural labourers to urban areas and to accelerate the urbanization of China. We recommend:
First, the government should follow the recommendations of the Rules for Migrant Workers to Participate in the Basic Pension Insurance in full consideration of the fact that migrant workers already tend to have very low income. It shall moderately lower the contribution rates of both migrant workers and their employers, and provide substantial subsidies from the national budget to ensure that migrant workers can enjoy the same benefits as urban workers. This can reduce the current burden of migrant workers and safeguard their future rights and interests.
Second, the government should accelerate coordination to extend basic pension insurance across provincial and national levels, apply a unified approach to determining the payment base and calculating pension contributions, and eliminate a source of inequity resulting from regional wage gaps in the process of transfer and continuation of pensions across jurisdictions.
Finally, the government shall integrate migrant workers into other social security programs, from medical insurance and compulsory education for their children to the urban social security system. This should be done as soon as possible in order to provide them with reasonable prospects for a good life in urban areas.
Appendix 1: Employment data
The China Labour Statistical Yearbook provided totals on person-years of urban and rural employment. The urban total allows us to calculate the numbers of person-years in urban skilled employment (USE) using data (also from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook) on the shares of workers in urban areas with post-highschool education. Urban unskilled employment (UUSE) was calculated by subtracting USE employment from the total number of employed urban persons.
Person-years of unemployment in 2002 are derived from assumptions about unemployment rates.
We assumed that the urban unemployment rate is about 6 per cent, slightly higher than the urban unemployment rate published in the China Statistical Yearbook. We assume the unemployment rate among migrant workers is about 4 percent, similar to the unemployment rate published in the China Statistical Yearbook. Unemployment in rural areas is very low because most rural people can work on allocated family land. However, we allowed for a small unemployment rate (about 1.4 per cent) to reflect time spent by rural employed persons in transition between the three different types of rural employment. Note: Since there changing shares of GDP create issues under changing prices, we made quantity indexes to deal with it on the income side, which is different from the expenditure side.
Appendix 2: Simulation results
